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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
and TELLURIDE POWER COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No.
7803

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH and NEPHI CITY,
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF
TELLURIDE POWER COMPANY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
NEPHI MAKES MANY MISSTATEMENTS,
EXAGGERATIONS AND HALF TRUTHS.
On page 4 Nephi states that Telluride claims Nephi City
as part of its territory. What Telluride claims is that it
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serves retail all around Nephi and wholesale to Nephi. It
does not retail electric energy in Nephi and never has. It
doesn't claim the right to do so although the Public Service
Commission could grant to Telluride a certificate to do so.
Nephi on page 2 challenges Telluride's statement that
Utah Power has never devoted any of its facilities to furnishing power for distribution south of Mona. This is said
· to be directly contrary to the evidence. This accusation is
based not upon evidence but upon a legal theory that Utah
Power Company dedicated itself to serve Nephi and other
southern cities because it sells power to Telluride which in
turn distributes to such places. As shown in Telluride's
original brief the uncontradicted evidence is that Utah Power
Company has no facilities for rendering service south of
Mona (R. 110-113).
There is a fundamental lack of understanding of the
power business running through Nephi's brief. It assumes
that the cost of transmission facilities is the only expense involved in rendering service by an electric power company.
It urges that since Nephi will build its own transmission
line from Mona to Nephi that the Commission's order imposes no expense on Utah Power. But when a power company holds itself out as willing to serve, or is ordered to
serve or offer to serve, a certain area with electric power,
it assumes or has thrust upon it the obligation to have that
power available which involves the greatest item of expense incident to rendering the service. If it is necessary
in order to construct new generating facilities it must do
so.. When the P.S.C. orders Utah Power Company to offer
to sell electricity to Nephi City, there is a great deal more
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involved than the mere words of offer. Utah Power Company must have the necessary power available and keep it
available. It must fulfill the obligation to render that service, although it has never professed to serve it.
Nephi on pages 21 and 22 argues that even though Utah
Power has not dedicated its property to rendering service
to Nephi City, yet it should have no objection because Nephi
is going to build its own transmission line and that therefore Utah Power & Light will merely be selling to Nephi the
same power which it has been selling to Telluride. This
statement is inconsistent with the record and disregards
an elementary principle of electric power utility law. In
the first place, it assumes that all power sold by Telluride
to Nephi is purchased from the Utah Power, which, as
shown under I, is not true. In the second place, it assumes
incorrectly that the obligation which it would have to Nephi
City would be the same as the obligation which it has to
Telluride. They are entirely different. The obligation to
Telluride is controlled by the contract between Telluride and
Utah Power, Exhibit 8, (R. 258) which provides that Utah
Power only has to furnish power to Telluride if it has an excess, and only to the extent of that excess. Of course under
the Commission's order directing Utah Power to offer to render service to Nephi City, Utah Power would have to make
good a full obligation to render service as an electric power
utility.
On pages 8 and 9 Nephi states that neither Telluride
nor Utah Power could under any circumstances secure the
right to distribute power in Nephi. The only truth in this
is that Nephi could refuse a franchise to use its streets.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Otherwise P. S.C. could grant either one or both of them a
certificate of convenience and necessity to sell power retail.
Merely because a municipality is engaged in the power business within its corporate limits does not mean that it is
without the possibility of competition. As a matter of fact,
Utah Power & Light Company continued to serve electric
power in competition with Logan City for 8 years after the
decision in the Logan City Power case in November, 1928.
On page 3 Nephi states that Utah Power constructed
the two transmission circuits to Mona for the express purpose of selling large quantities of power to Telluride for
distribution throughout Southern Utah. There is no such
evidence. These lines are used to render service to the
Thermoid Company Plant about two thousand feet north of
Nephi and to deliver power purchased by Telluride (R. 99,
100). They were not for the purpose of distributing power
to Southern Utah. The power was sold by Utah Power to
Telluride for whatever purposes Telluride desired to use it.
STATEMENT OF POINTS DISCUSSED
I.
THE FACT THAT TELLURIDE BUYS POWER
FROM UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY IS
ENTIRELY IMMATERIAL.
II.
NEPHI CITY DID NOT SECEDE FROM UTAH
BY GOING INTO THE ELECTRIC POWER
BUSINESS IN 1903. THE STATE RETAINS
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ALL SOVEREIGN POWERS EXCEPT THAT IT
MAY NOT DELEGATE THE RIGHT TO REGULATE NEPHI IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS
ELECTRICAL POWER BUSINESS.
III.
NONE OF THE CASES CITED BY NEPHI
HOLD THAT P. S. C. CAN SUBJECT TELLURIDE TO THE HAZARDS OF COMPETITION
UNLESS SERVICE IS UNSATISFACTORY.

I.
THE FACT THAT TELLURIDE BUYS POWER
FROM UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY IS
ENTIRELY IMMATERIAL.
Throughout its brief Nephi lays much emphasis and
bases many of its arguments upon the circumstance that
Telluride purchases part of its power requirements from
Utah Power. Analysis will demonstrate that the circumstance is entirely immaterial-just as immaterial as the
circumstance that Nephi sells power to Telluride (R. 134).
(a)

All electric power sold by Telluride to Nephi City

is the property of Telluride and Telluride is solely responsible for its

ava~iability

and delivery.

In the statement of facts and throughout the brief,
Nephi City repeatedly states as a major premise to its
arguments that the power distributed by Telluride to Nephi
is fifty per cent from Utah Power. On page 17 Nephi makes
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the extreme statement that even if the plaintiffs prevail,
all of the power delivered by Telluride to Nephi is from
Utah Power. There is no evidence in the record to sustain
these reckless statements of Nephi. On the contrary, they
are refuted by the uncontradicted evidence in the case.
Exhibit 10 (R. 279) is a map of the Telluride Power system
and shows its extent from Mona through Nephi, westerly to
the Delta area and southerly to Richfield, Marysvale, Milford, Panguitch.
The power generated by Telluride in four hydroelectric
plants ( R. 188) constitutes about fifty per cent of what
it distributes (R. 188, 209). The balance is purchased by it
from interconnections. It interconnects with Nephi, Beaver,
Manti, Ephraim, Mount Pleasant, Utah Power & Light, Big
Springs Power Company, Gar-Kane Electric Association,
and Southern Utah Power Company (R. 188). All of these
companies buy and sell from each other (R. 188). Telluride
buys from Utah Power (R. 189) and sells to Utah Power
(R. 206). The Power Interchange Agreement is Exhibit 8
(R. 258). Specifically, Telluride buys from each of the
municipal plants above named and sells to each of the municipal plants named (R. 188). Specifically, Nephi sells power
to Telluride (R. 134). Specifically, Telluride sells to Southern Utah Power Company (R. 207).
Page 86 of the Telluride annual report for 1949, which
was made part of the record (R. 198) shows that in 1949
Telluride bought and sold from and to Nephi, Southern Utah
Power Company, Manti City, Big Springs Power Company,
Beaver City, Mount Pleasant and Ephraim City.
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There are certain insinuations in the record and in
the Nephi brief that there is something inefficient about
Telluride buying power from other companies. No more
hydroelectric power is available in the area (R. 216). It is
therefore the duty of Telluride to secure power in order to
meet its obligations as a public service company either by
steam plants or by purchasing from others, whichever is
cheaper (R. 200). It is a well recognized principle of the
electric power industry that a steam plant is economical only
if there is a big enough demand for the power and that in
any area such as the Telluride area it would be uneconomical
and wasteful (R. 166). For Telluride to manufacture electric
power in a steam plant at greater expense than it could be
purchased from others would, of course, be a violation of
its duty as a public utility.

Logan City v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company, 77 Utah 442, 296 Pac.
1006.
Accordingly, Telluride has entered into this pooling
arrangement in which any of the participants requiring more
power can secure it and any of them having excess power
can sell it. It is an efficient and economical way of conducting the business. It is freely admitted that Telluride has
plenty of power at all times to fulfill its obligation to render
service (R. 231).
So also Utah Power & Light interconnects at the south
with Telluride and at the north with Idaho power and Montana power (R. 115). Those companies in turn interconnect with Oregon and Washington power companies. The
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result is that Utah power may be used as far in the northwest as Washington and Washington power may be used as
far southeast as Utah, Nephi, Richfield, Marysvale and
Panguitch.
Title to the power purchased and sold passes at the
point of delivery (R. 218). As between Telluride and Utah
Power & Light this is at Mona, as stated by Nephi City in
its brief. The responsibility of Utah Power & Light Company
ceases at that point and that of the Telluride Company
commences. All of the power sold by Telluride to anyone is
Telluride power. At times it consists exclusively of power
manufactured by Telluride (R. 217). At times that power is
mixed with power from the municipalities (R. 188). Telluride does not resort to Utah Power until it has exhausted the
excess power of the municipalities because the rate is higher.
All of the power manufactured or drawn into its system by
Telluride form its system-wide pool (R. 207). None of the
power is earmarked. All of it has lost its identity. It is all
Telluride power from the instant of delivery.
The fact that Utah Power sells power to Telluride for resale does not constitute a dedication by Utah
Power of its property to serve areas where that power may
be resold.
(b)

On page 2 and elsewhere in Nephi's brief it is argued
that Utah Power has devoted its facilities to furnishing
power south of Mona. This is contrary to the uncontradicted
evidence in the case (R. 101, 110-113, 119). It is based upon
an erroneous legal theory that when Utah Power sells power
to Telluride, and Telluride sells power to Nephi, that Utah
Power has thereby dedicated its property to serve Nephi.
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The argument carries Nephi City much too far. If that
is true of Nephi City, it would also be true of Milford, Marysvale, Delta, Panguitch, Cedar City, Idaho, Montana, Oregon,
Washington. It would mean that Utah Power could be compelled by the Commission, as it was compelled in the case
at bar, to render service to people in Kanab, Cedar City,
Panguitch, etc. etc.; and that Southern Utah Power would
have to render service to Salt Lake.

II.
NEPHI CITY DID NOT SECEDE FROM UTAH
BY GOING INTO THE ELECTRIC POWER
BUSINESS IN 1903. THE STATE RETAINS
ALL SOVEREIGN POWERS EXCEPT THAT IT
MAY NOT DELEGATE THE RIGHT TO REGULATE NEPHI IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS
ELECTRICAL POWER BUSINESS.
On page 4 Nephi states that Telluride is trying to get
the court to believe that the contract with Nephi converted
Nephi into Telluride territory. No reliance is placed by
Telluride on that contract. It is like any other contract
made by a public utility corporation. The reliance is upon
the dedication of its property by Telluride to the area including Nephi, of furnishing power for retail and for resale.
On page 8, Nephi states that P. S.C. has no jurisdiction
to compel Nephi to purchase power from Telluride. It
seems to forget that this action was brought by Nephi to
secure an order from the Commission requiring Utah Power
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to sell electricity to Nephi. In other words, Nephi has invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission, conceding not
only that the Commission has jurisdiction but that the
Commission can say "Yes" or "No" and can exercise a
proper discretion.
Nephi City makes the argument that the Nephi City
area is withdrawn from all regulation the same as if it
had been transplanted to another state. A moment's reflection rejects such an extreme statement. Merely because
Logan City went into the power business and was not subject to regulation, as decided by this court, did not oust the
Utah Power & Light Company from its business of-retailing electricity in Logan. It carried on that business for 8
years after the Supreme Court decision. It discontinued the
retail service only after it became convinced that it could
not compete with the city, which charged rates so low as
to cause a deficit, which was made up by taxes. If the
Utah Power & Light Company had had similar power of
taxation it would probably be operating there still.
On page 5, et seq., Nephi cites the constitution and
quotes lengthily from Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission as if Telluride were contending contrary to the decision
of the Supreme Court of Utah in the Logan Power case.
Of course Telluride recognizes the full force of that case.
Telluride understands thoroughly that Nephi is not subject
to regulation by the Commission with respect to its electric
power business. Telluride understands that the Commission cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. This
was all conceded at the trial. But inasmuch as Nephi is
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seeking to have the P. S. C. exercise its discretion to require Utah Power to sell power to Nephi, according to the
words of Nephi's own counsel (R. 313), Nephi must submit
and indeed has submitted to the jurisdiction of the P. S. C.
Nephi must not only appeal to the jurisdiction of
P. S. C. to permit it to secure power from Utah Power,
but in many other ways it must comply with the Public
Utilities Law. If Nephi City ships freight for its electric
power plant by rails or trucks from Salt Lake City it must
pay the freight rate established by the schedules filed with
and approved by the Public Service Commission. It cannot
make a separate contract for a lesser rate.
If Nephi has need of supplies to be brought from Salt
Lake City and desires them carried by a common carrier
it must deal with the common carrier having a certificate
of convenience and necessity to move freight from Salt
Lake City to Nephi. Nephi cannot make a special contract
with a common carrier, say, who operates between Salt
Lake City and Price, Utah.
Nephi has not seceded from Utah. It is subject to the
police power of the state in all particulars.
In Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. (2d) 530,
our court upheld the constitutionality of the Metropolitan
Water District Act in spite of Article VI, Section 29 of
the Constitution. On page 535 the court said:
"It is contended the act is unconstitutional as
an attempt to unlawfully delegate the power of taxation to a special commission and to interfere in
city and town affairs in violation of the provisions
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of article VI, § 29, which reads as follows: 'The
Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any
power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects,
whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to
select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal
functions.'

"* * * The power of control vested in the
board of directors is over the property, improvements, money, and effects of the district, and not
that of any of the cities or towns whose territorial
boundaries may be coincidental with that of the district or included therein. The powers of the board
are limited by the act to the levying of taxes for
the public purposes mentioned therein.
"None of the municipal functions of the component cities or towns is conferred on or delegated
to the Metropolitan Water District. Each of such
cities and towns will possess and may continue to
exercise every municipal function it now has. There
need be no friction between the two, but the closest
cooperation is contemplated and should result."

Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah
183, 51 P. (2d) 645. The Liquor Control Act authorized the
State Liquor Commission to regulate the sale of alcoholic
beverages within municipalities. It was contended that this
offended Article 6, Section 29. The court held it did not.
On page 656 the court said :

"* * * The state's authority to regulate and
control the sale of light beer becomes a municipal
function when, and only when, the state divests itself and invests a municipality with such powers.
A municipality acquired such authority, if at all, by
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an act of the Legislature. No such power is conferred upon counties, cities, or towns within the
state by the Constitution. The state having, as it
does, plenary power to either grant to or withhold
from municipalities the right to control the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors, it follows
that the state may confer limited authority upon
municipalities and retain to itself all control not so
granted. * * *"

Provo City v. Department of Business Regulation, 218
P. (2d) 675. The Public Service Commission made an order
that public convenience and necessity did not require the
opening of Ninth South Street across the yards of the Rio
Grande in Provo. It was contended by Provo City that
Article 6, Section 29, prohibited the Commission from in
any way affecting the public roads in Provo. On page 678
the court said :
"Article VI, Section 29, of the Constitution of
this State, which is the Section relied upon by the
city, restricts the legislature from delegating power
to commissions to interfere with local self-government of cities. * * *

*

*

*

*

*

"From the proVIsiOns of this section it is apparent that the framers of the constitution intended
that control over railroads operating within this
state should rest with the legislative department of
the state. Such an intent is consistent with the nature of the operations and problems of railroads.
For the most part, their activities are the concern
of the general public rather than of the individual
communities they serve.
"Under the constitutional provision quoted
above, the legislature has, in turn, delegated certain
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powers to the cities and other powers to the commission. * * *"
In considering the Logan City case, it must be borne
in mind that the Utah Power & Light Company was not
required by the decision in the Supreme Court to discontinue the rendition of electric energy public service in
Logan. The court held only that the Commission did not
have jurisdiction to regulate the rates of Logan City.
Utah Power continued to operate in Logan for 8 years
after November, 1928, the date of the Logan Power decision,
until it learned that it could not compete for business in
Logan because Logan fixed its rates so low that they were
noncompensatory and in fact lost money which was made
good from the payment of taxes. But so far as the law was
concerned the Utah Power & Light Company had the right
to continue to render service in Logan and it did so for 8
years.
Nephi argues from the case of Mackay Light & Powe·r
Company v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, that
Nephi, by serving the public with electric power, removed
its territory from the control of the P. S. C. as completely
and effectively as if such territory had been bodily taken
and moved into some other state. If so, why did Nephi
invoke the jurisdiction of the P. S. C. in this very case.
Nephi's argument and the order of the Commission
are based upon this misconception of the law. Nephi did
not secede from Utah in 1903 by going into the electric
power business. The only effect was that it is not subject
-to regulation by the Public Service Commission as to the
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conduct of that particular business. In all other particulars Nephi is subject to regulation like all other municipalities. If Nephi purchases power from a company regulated
by the P. S. C. it must comply with the regulations of the
P. S.C.
Nephi City has admitted this throughout the case.
At R. 313, Nephi City made the following statement:
"It (the municipality) can purchase its power
anywhere it is available, except that it must get the
approval of the P. S. C. if it attempts to purchase
from a regulated utility."

Again, Nephi City said at R. 313:
"The only restriction on the purchase of power
by Nephi that the P. S. C. or anyone else can place
is that if it purchases power from a regulated utility
the P. S. C. must approve."
Again at R. 313, Nephi City said:
"This regulation of the P. S. C. in the case of a
purchase of power from a regulated utility has
nothing to do with city boundaries. That permission
would be necessary even if the regulated utility were
generating power within the city. It is equally true
if it were generating power outside the city. The
important thing is that it is a regulated utility and
not where it is located."
..-"

The acts of Nephi City speak even louder than its words .
Nephi City filed this application with the Public Service
Commission and thus appealed to its jurisdiction and discretion. If Nephi City had had the absolute right to buy
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power from the Utah Power & Light Company, as stated by
the Commission, (R. 47) no petition to the Public Service
Commission need have been made. It would only have been
necessary to bring an action to compel Utah Power & Light
Company to perform its clear legal duty.

III.
NONE OF THE CASES CITED BY NEPHI
HOLD THAT P. S. C. CAN SUBJECT TELLURIDE TO THE HAZARDS OF COMPETITION
UNLESS SERVICE IS UNSATISFACTORY.
Nephi relies most strongly on two cases, Union Electric
Company of Missouri on pages 9, 18 and 24, and Mackay
Light & Power Company v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power
Company on pages 11-14. Neither case supports Nephi's
contention.
The following fundamental and elementary differences
in the facts of the Missouri case make it inapplicable:
1. At page 431 the Commission says that the
evidence showed that the Sho-Me east line could not
be relied upon for maintaining proper voltage and
that evidence was introduced to show dissatisfaction
of the city and its residents with the service received. In the Telluride case no dissatisfaction was
shown or suggested.

2. In the Missouri case neither utility possessed
a certificate of convenience and necessity to render
any service within the City of Rolla or its immediate
vicinity. See page 432. Telluride, on the other hand,
.does possess a certificate of convenience and neces-
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.,.
":

sity to sell power wholesale to Nephi and also to
serve retail outside the city limits of Nephi.

~::

3. On page 433 the Missouri Commission stated
that it could not be said that the City of Rolla was
within the allotted service area of either the ShoMe or the Union. In the Telluride case the area in
question is within the allotted service area of Telluride and not Utah Power & Light Company.

t.:

4. In the Missouri case the utility corresponding to Utah Power & Light Company was the applicant for a certificate authorizing it to render service to the municipality. Utah Power & Light Company, on the contrary, is resisting the effort of
Nephi City.

..--·
~

:;;.
-'

On pages 11-14 defendant relies heavily on Mackay L.
& P. Co. v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, vehemently stating that it involved the "identical problem"
and that it "perfectly parallels" the case at bar, and that
the Idaho Commission confirmed the right of the village
of Arco to bypass the Mackay Company to acquire power
from the Ashton Company. We commend this case to the
careful reading of the court. Nephi not only misstates the
facts but misstates the decision of the Commission. The
actual holding of the case was that the Commission disapproved a proposed contract between Arco and the Ashton
Company for the construction of transmission lines so that
power of the Ashton Company could be used by Arco. See
page 12.
The Mackay Company was granted a certificate of
convenience and necessity by the Commission on June 13,
1919 (see page 8).
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The Ashton Company had been granted a certificate
of convenience and necessity on February 11, 1915, to operate in a certain territory which included the point to
which Ashton proposed to construct a transmission line
to connect with a transmission line to be constructed by
Arco. The contract covering this proposed transaction was
the one under discussion in the case. The town of Arco
was not even a party to the action.
The language quoted by defendant on pages 12 to 1·4
of its brief was pure dictum. The Commission was of the
opinion that the Ashton Company, which was subject to
regulation, was hiding behind the village of Arco, which
was not subject to regulation, to do something that it would
not otherwise have the right to do. The contract was therefore condemned. On page 11 the Commission said:
"The Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company,
being a utility under the control of the Commission,
will not be permitted to invade the territory of a
rival utility by hiding behind the law exempting
municipal corporations from the jurisdiction of the
Commission. Some of the provisions of the contract
between said defendant Ashton & St. Anthony Power
Company and the village of Arco, introduced as an
exhibit in this case, indicate that said defendant
is attempting, by means of said contract, to acquire
for itself some advantage other than serving the
village of Arco, in the territory covered by the certificate of complainant. Also the wording of said
contract indicates that said village of Arco contemplates the securing, under said contract, of electric
energy in excess of its needs for use within the
municipality, and that it proposes to sell and distribute such excess in territory adjacent to, and
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outside of, the village limits under the provisions
of § 3971, Idaho Compiled Statutes.
"The Commission does not approve such contract, and will not approve any provision by which
the village of Arco gives or attempts to give to said
defendant, Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company,
any right to own or operate any electric transmission line or equipment, or any interest therein, or
any exclusive right to purchase same, or any interest therein, or any advantage at all, in territory
covered by the certificate of complainant herein
outside the corporate limits of said village of
Arco, unless it is expressly predicated upon the
securing of a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission by said defendant, Ashton
& St. Anthony Power Company, authorizing it to
enter said territory."
Thus it is evident that defendant's statement that this
case confirmed the right of Arco to bypass the Mackay
Company and acquire property from the Ashton Company
is incorrect. On the contra1.·y, the Commission refused to
approve such contract.
On pages 14-15, Nephi cites Town of Kearney v. Passaic
Consolidated Water Company and Village District of Belmont v. La Gonia Gas & Electric Company. Neither case is
in point.
In the Kearney case the supply of water served by the
New Jersey Suburban Water Company was inadequate to
the needs of the Town of Kearney. In the case now before
the Utah Public Service Commission, no one claims that
Telluride cannot serve all the needs of Nephi City.
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In the Belmont case, both the La Coni a Gas & Electric
Company and the Tilton Electric Light & Power Company
had certificates to serve the Town of Belmont. Tilton had
been serving for several years and Belmont desired to change
and purchase from the La Conia Power Company. The New
Hampshire Public Service Commission permitted a change
and said:
"The La Conia Company has general authority
to operate as a public utility in the Town of Belmont.
Since it has this privilege the law imposes upon it the
duty to serve, upon reasonable terms, anyone in Belmont desiring service."
In the case at bar Utah Power & Light Company has no
operating authority to serve south of Mona, whereas in the
New Hampshire case the La Conia Power had general authority to serve in the area of the Town of Belmont.
On pages 17 and 19, Nephi cites the case of North Salt
Lake v. St. Joseph Water' & Irrigation Company. Plaintiff
is unable to understand what pertinency this case has. It
merely holds that the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over the number of connections made by a water
company.
On page 18 Nephi cites the cases of Alabama Power Co.
v. Guntersville, from Alabama. The case merely holds that
an electric power utility corporation established in a city
does not have a constitutional right of monopoly and that
the municipality may enter the electric power business. The
case is the same as the Logan City Power case and recognizes
the right of Alabama Power Company to continue in business in competition with the municipality.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
On page 18 Nephi cites the case of People v. Loveland,
from Colorado. This case merely holds that under the Colorado constitution a city has the right to go into the electric
power business.
In summary, Nephi has not cited a single case wherein
a Public Service Commission has permitted a utility serving
a neighboring area under a certificate limiting its service
to that area to invade, directly or indirectly, the area adequately served by a neighboring utility, also operating under
a limited geographical certificate.
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's order
should be set aside as illegal.

Respectfully submitted,
H. R. WALDO,
W. Q. VAN COTT,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Telluride Power Company.
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